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Making Things to Serve Sultans, Viziers 
and Army Commanders (1450-1800)
Suraiya Faroqhi*
Ottoman documents on manufactures for court and army concentrate 
on governmental initiatives. However, the time has come to view these 
branches of production in a broader, comparative perspective, focusing 
on the demands of the sultan’s officials and the actions of skilled persons 
working for the apparatus of empire. 
 As for the production of military hardware, the demands of eighteenth-
century warfare fell most heavily on the more prosperous workshops; and 
the lack of working capital became a permanent worry after the Russo-
Ottoman war of 1768–74. However, until about 1750, the sultans’ military 
machine was still ahead of the Russians in the supply of armaments and 
foodstuffs. Technology and the lack of manufacturing skills, thus, were not 
at issue when Ottoman armies suffered defeat.
Historians concerned with court and state manufactures in early modern 
Europe often feel that they need to restore legitimacy to a type of enterprise 
that during the last 30 years or so has generally suffered from a ‘bad press’. 
In the neoliberal environment which we inhabit, economists and economic 
historians have decried state manufactures as inefficient, unresponsive 
to technological innovation and even as especially amenable to political 
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‘influence’ or corruption. In contradistinction, in recent years a tendency 
has emerged that regards court- and state-sponsored enterprises as positive 
because their contribution towards the emergence of a labour force skilled 
in manufacturing, especially in environments where nothing of the kind 
had existed before. Moreover, the privileges-accorded entrepreneurs in this 
state-dominated sector often created a climate propitious to innovation, 
as non-privileged manufacturers became aware of new methods and 
techniques. In addition, the economic performance of court and state 
manufactures was quite often significantly better than their detractors 
had assumed. Broadly speaking, these points function as arguments for 
‘bringing the state back’ into the history of manufacturing.1
Many scholars working on the early Ottoman Empire, by contrast, 
have but rarely felt the need for ‘bringing in’ an entity that in the 
historiographical world in which they operate has never been ‘out’ in the 
first place. Partly, this preponderance of the state is a result of the sources, 
in their overwhelming majority the work of officialdom. Current or former 
officials have even authored most narrative sources, including the many 
chronicles penned between the 1500s and the late nineteenth century; if 
these bureaucrats had not made a living by the use of their pens, Ottomanist 
historians would be in no better case than their colleagues working, for 
instance, on mediaeval Southeast Asia.2
In addition, the interest of twentieth- and twenty-first-century historians 
in the Ottoman state is an outcome of the political situation during the last 
century: following the collapse of the empire after the First World War, the 
Republic of Turkey came into being as a result of a ferociously fought war 
against Greece, and indirectly England, with France and Italy playing more 
episodic roles as adversaries of the Turkish nationalists. As the fighting 
had destroyed people and infrastructure, the newly formed state—and the 
military as its most powerful sector—became almost the sole actor not 
only in politics but also in manufacturing, with civil society quite weak 
until the last decade of the twentieth century. In Turkey, Ottoman history 
thus became the history of the Ottoman state, and scholars regarding this 
situation as unsatisfactory have had a difficult time convincing their readers 
that there was indeed a world outside of the state and military apparatus.
1 The term was coined by Evans, Rueschemayer and Scocpol.
2 The term ‘Ottomanist’ denotes scholars who have worked/work on Ottoman history 
after the demise of the empire in 1922–23.
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On the other hand, the time has certainly come to introduce the 
substantial historiography on Ottoman court and state manufactures to 
non-Ottomanist researchers working in a comparative mode. For once, 
scholars interested in the Ottoman world find that they are in good and 
numerous company; for, after all, production intended for the ruler/elite 
and the attendant courts, armies and navies has existed, and exists, in quite 
a few polities the world over.3 Even in early modern England, where luxury 
manufactures specific to the court were extremely rare, naval arsenals and 
the shipbuilding that was the basis of English/British world power were 
invariably under the direction of officers and other appointees of the crown.
Viewed from this perspective, the Ottoman case is in no way 
exceptional: we find both the production of luxury goods for the palace 
and an active and quite well-documented manufacture of arms and ships. 
However, while historians dealing with early modern Europe have been 
much interested in ‘spin-offs’, put differently in the unintended side 
effects of court and state enterprises upon nascent industrialisations, in 
the Ottoman world this issue is only relevant to a limited extent. As recent 
scholarship has shown, when engineering became a separate profession in 
the late 1700s and early 1800s, specialists in naval and military engineering 
were significantly in advance of their colleagues in charge of civilian 
projects, thus providing models for the latecomers to emulate.4 Only in 
this specific sector, Ottoman state-sponsored enterprise resulted in ‘spin-
offs’ from which civilian production could benefit.
State Demands and the Market: The Interplay  
of Centralised and Decentralised Production
In reaction against the state-centred focus characterising a large section of 
Ottomanist historiography, the present summary discusses the interplay 
between the demands of the sultan’s officials on the one hand and the 
actions of skilled persons on the other, the latter usually from the subject 
population and in search of markets for their work. For many artisans/
artists (ehl-i hiref), even if employed by the army or palace, worked for 
outsiders as well. In many cases, they would have been unable to subsist 
3 These introductory lines take up discussions from the symposium ‘State Manufactures 
in a Global and Comparative Perspective’ (Florence, September 2014).
4 Martykánová, Reconstructing Ottoman Engineers.
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otherwise, as their regular salaries, comparable to the pay received by 
soldiers, seriously contracted in times of inflation. When working for the 
sultan in jobs requiring specialist knowledge, it was customary for highly 
skilled artisans and artists to make gifts to the ruler, for which they could 
expect a counter-gift. In spite of the salaries granted and received, the 
relationship between the sultans and the artists/artisans they employed 
thus was not fully commercial.
A few high-ranking officials including viziers might act as patrons of 
luxury goods, or at least they mediated between the sultan and the writers 
and/or artists producing illustrated manuscripts.5 Certainly, the means of 
these officials were smaller than those of the sultan; even so, the latter could 
often afford a significant range of fancy goods. While only a tiny fraction 
of the luxuries once owned by Ottoman dignitaries are still in existence, 
chance survivals such as the two ‘salons’ (başoda) from the house of an 
eighteenth-century Christian notable from the town of Kastorya, today in 
northern Greece, show that there were wealthy provincial families able to 
afford richly decorated interiors. Similarly, ornamented chambers were in 
use among the notables of Damascus and Aleppo as well.6 Patronage by 
non-royal elite figures must thus have been more substantial than present-
day collections indicate. Our views are one-sided as more often than not, 
surviving pieces of artwork used by non-royals have come down to us 
because of later confiscation and appropriation by the Ottoman palace. 
Things that the sultan did not need or want often no longer exist.
However, we need to insist on the uncertainties of palace employment; 
and as noted, many skilled artisans/artists looked out for supplementary 
sources of income. Where miniature painting is concerned, Tülay Artan 
has pointed out that certain painters even combined their artwork with 
a courtly or military-administrative career.7 Regrettably, we do not 
know whether such people were in high regard because of their official 
positions, or whether their painter colleagues regarded them as dubious 
amateurs. Artan moreover has questioned the established distinction 
between miniature painters in the employment of the palace and their 
colleagues working for the bazaar. She has suggested that when palace 
5 Fetvacı, Picturing History at the Ottoman Court: 21.
6 Fotopoulos and Delivorrias, Greece at the Benaki Museum: 408–11; and Gonella and 
Kröger, Angels, Peonies, and Fabulous Creatures.
7 Artan, ‘Arts and Architecture’: 412.
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patronage gradually fell away after the death of Ahmed I in 1617, and 
more dramatically after the virtual transferral of the court to Edirne in the 
second half of the seventeenth century, competent painters worked for a 
paying clientele in Istanbul. Upon occasion, even foreign ambassadors 
commissioned Ottoman artwork.8
Other ‘state-sponsored’ manufactures operated in the military and 
naval sectors. Furthermore, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 
the construction sites of the major sultanic pious foundations such 
as the mosque complexes of Mehmed the Conqueror (Fatih) or the 
Süleymaniye functioned as public enterprises very much resembling 
campaigns. Large sums of money were at issue; and Sultan Ahmed 
I (r. 1603–17) attracted criticism because he had not made any booty from 
which to finance the major mosque complex that he put up towards the end 
of his reign. As a legitimising response, one of his courtiers made much 
of his monarch’s generosity in sponsoring such an elaborate structure.9
But even if in sultanic construction projects, central supervision played 
a major role, such worksites were not necessarily monolithic. Rather, 
controls were more or less stringent, depending on whether the workshop 
produced most inputs under direct official supervision, or alternatively, the 
responsible project directors purchased semi-finished products according 
to need. Under certain circumstances, artisans thus might adopt innovations 
in style or technology upon their own initiative. In the firearms sector 
especially, people that had mastered a certain technology often seem to 
have passed on their knowledge outside of the closed circle of ‘state-
sponsored’ workmen.
Every historiography is a child of its time; thus, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
with the Turkish state a dominant factor in the economy, historians such 
as Ömer Lütfi Barkan and Halil İnalcık emphasised central control over 
production, not only through direct interventions by the sultans’ bureaucrats 
but by more indirect means as well. In this context, they stressed the large 
complexes of pious foundations which Ottoman monarchs established or 
permitted their relatives to establish, the administration remaining in the 
hands of court-appointed officials. At the same time, these foundations had 
a significant impact upon urban production and trade, as they rented out 
shops and workshops and covered markets to finance religious, educational 
8 Ibid.: 451.
9 Murphey, ‘Mustafa Safi’s Version of the Kingly Virtues’.
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and charitable activities. For Barkan, the major sultanic foundations 
resembled the ‘mixed’ state–private enterprises of his own days, in which 
the state often had the upper hand.10 By contrast, İnalcık stressed the role 
of sultanic pious foundations in capital formation; but this author clearly 
sensed that accumulation of productive capital was not the strongest point 
of the Ottoman socio-political system.11
In the last 20 years or so, however, historians have gone beyond 
these general assumptions by investigating, often in fine detail, centrally 
controlled manufactures producing goods required by the court and the 
military. Thus, we now possess studies on the naval arsenal, the cannon 
foundry, the manufacture of gunpowder and most recently the mint.12 
Art historians have concentrated on the production of luxury goods for 
sultans and other elite personages, with special attention to illustrated 
manuscripts. In these studies, they often discuss how private sponsorship 
and that of the sultans interacted. Pious foundations, by contrast, today 
appear mostly in the context of Islamic law. In conformity with present-
day ideologies, their role in facilitating government interventions has 
become a secondary point.
In the present article, we highlight the interaction of Ottoman central 
control and private, often market-oriented, initiatives, introducing a group 
of monographs that analyse the highly centralised workshops previously 
referred to, including the mint. However, at least in the eighteenth century, 
the latter could not have functioned without the input of individual sarrafs, 
money changers about to turn into bankers. As for the ‘men of skill’ 
working for the sultan, they sometimes served the court and sometimes 
satisfied market demand. Thus, the faience manufacturers of Iznik, who 
have become the subject of important art historical monographs, not only 
made panels for the sultans’ mosques and palaces, but also plates and bowls 
for well-to-do customers.13 The woollen cloth manufacturers of Salonika, 
once a focus of scholarly interest but today somewhat neglected, are a 
10 Barkan, ‘Şehirlerin Teşekkül ve İnkişafı Tarihi Bakımından’.
11 Inalcik, ‘Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire’; Inalcik, ‘The Ottoman Economic 
Mind’.
12 Ágoston, Osmanlı’da Strateji ve Askerî Güç; Bacqué Grammont, ‘La fonderie de canons 
d’Istanbul et le quartier de Tophane’; Bölükbaşı, 18. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Darphane-i 
Amire; Bostan, Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilâtı; Gölen, Osmanlı Devleti'nde Baruthane-i Amire; 
Tunç, Tophane-i Amire ve Osmanlı Devletinde Top Döküm Faaliyetleri.
13 For instance, Denny, Iznik: The Artistry of Ottoman Ceramics.
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nearly ideal example of decentralised workshops trying to cope with the 
demands of a distant centre. And to conclude our overview, we briefly 
dwell upon the gunsmiths that produced the muskets indispensable to 
any army of the 1500s or 1600s; remarkably and for reasons that remain 
unclear, this branch of production seems to have mostly escaped the control 
of Ottoman bureaucrats.
Centralised Production with a Twist: The Naval Arsenal
In early modern polities including the Ottoman Empire, naval arsenals, 
cannon foundries, gunpowder manufactures and fortresses all required 
technologies rather more advanced than most non-military industrial 
enterprises; and the naval arsenal of Istanbul is a good example of this 
tendency.14 Located on the Golden Horn in the suburb of Kasımpaşa, 
this enterprise produced warships, at first mainly galleys, which in the 
Mediterranean context were easier to manoeuvre than sailing ships. But 
from the second half of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman navy finally 
switched to galleons and other vessels using only sails, which permitted 
the deployment of more firepower. However, given the advantages of the 
galley, especially in shallow waters, this change took several decades to 
complete. During the Cretan war against Venice (1645–69), Ottoman naval 
commanders cautiously experimented with this novelty; but afterwards, 
they provisionally returned to galleys. Only after 1682 did viziers and 
naval commanders switch over to sailing vessels in earnest, perhaps the 
need to train soldier-sailors to handle guns of a type not used on galleys 
slowed down the changeover.15
Both free workers and slaves laboured in the arsenal, the latter often 
former captives taken at sea or captured in raids against the coasts of 
southern Italy. People from this latter region so often wound up in servitude 
because Naples and Sicily were part of the kingdom of Spain, with whose 
rulers the Ottoman sultans had no formal peace treaty before the late 
1700s.16 In addition to its productive functions, the arsenal housed oarsmen 
propelling the galleys. Perhaps in order to make communication among 
these unfortunates difficult and thus prevent uprisings, it was common to 
14 Bostan, Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilâtı.
15 Bostan, Kürekli ve Yelkenli Osmanlı gemileri: 114–16.
16 Marmara, İstanbul Deniz Zindanı 1740.
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‘mix’ enslaved captives, draftees that for instance the Istanbul boatmen 
needed to supply, and common criminals. For when in the 1500s, frequent 
naval battles resulted in serious losses of manpower, the authorities began 
to sentence people to servitude on the galleys who otherwise might have 
been executed.
As the campaign season began in May and ended in November, the 
Ottoman navy lay in port during the winter. In this ‘dead season’, the 
galley slaves received only minimal supplies, which they supplemented 
by earnings in petty crafts and trade; petty theft was by no means unknown 
either. Michael Heberer von Bretten, who served as a rower on Ottoman 
galleys for several years during the 1580s, has left a vivid description of 
slaves knitting woollen stockings; interestingly, this same craft was also 
common among the galley slaves of the French king in Marseilles and 
Toulon.17 Slaves who served as assistants in shipbuilding also lived in 
the naval arsenal.
During the sixteenth century, Muslims predominated among free 
arsenal labourers; but by about 1650, the workforce was predominantly 
Orthodox.18 Perhaps we can explain this change by the closure of the 
Venetian naval arsenal on the island of Crete, which occurred in the early 
1600s. Apparently, many jobless arsenal workers found employment in 
Istanbul, over time some of them probably turned into Ottoman zımmis 
or non-Muslim subjects.19
Large quantities of semi-finished goods arrived in Kasımpaşa, often 
from fairly distant regions, by means of a rather elaborate procurement 
system. Sailcloth, mostly of cotton, came largely from Western Anatolia, 
a situation which explains why in the 1500s the sultans forbade the 
exportation of raw cotton. But after 1600, with production probably 
increasing, this prohibition first became intermittent and ultimately 
disappeared.20 As cash to finance semi-finished goods was always in short 
supply, the central government tried to discharge its debts by instructing 
tax farmers to pay the producers and deduct the money thus expended from 
the payments they would need to make at the end of the year. In practice, 
this arrangement resulted in a no-interest loan to the Ottoman treasury. 
17 Heberer von Bretten, Aegyptiaca Servitus: 245.
18 Çizakça, ‘Ottomans and the Mediterranean’.
19 Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople.
20 Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia: 135–37.
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Whatever the mode of financing, the arsenal thus relied on sailcloth 
produced outside of its own direct purview.
The production of hemp and the preliminary treatments required to 
make this material suitable for cordage took place in the provinces too, 
particularly in and around the town of Samsun on the Anatolian Black 
Sea coast.21 In certain areas, people had to furnish fixed quantities of 
hemp, at low prices or even in lieu of taxes, an obligation that cultivators 
tried to avoid if possible. Either a special official or else the local district 
judge were in charge of purchases, and if sixteenth-century complaints 
reflect reality, honesty was not the defining quality of these officials. Hemp 
was also the subject of private trade; for in Istanbul, there were many 
shipowners and fishermen generating substantial private demand for hemp 
and cordage. For the time being, however, we do not know very much about 
the interface between government procuring systems and private trade.
But the most important procurement problem surely concerned timber. 
In the 1600s, north-western Anatolia still had a substantial forest cover, and 
the area surrounding the Bay of İzmit grew tall straight trees very suitable 
for masts. Certain areas only served the navy. But given the high-level 
private demand for timber in Istanbul, smuggling was a serious problem.22 
From the subjects’ point of view, the administrators in charge of timber 
procurement for the naval arsenal were a source of trouble, because of 
their attempts to expand the area set aside for the arsenal, without taking 
into account the rights of the local population to timber and firewood.
A high level of supervision was current in the arsenal of Istanbul: 
in the early 1600s, the adjacent area, known as the Arsenal Garden 
(Tersane bahçesi) actually became the site of a minor imperial palace, 
where the court spent a good deal of time, especially during the first 
half of the eighteenth century. Ottoman sources apparently did not claim 
that strengthening control over the naval arsenal and the nearby—and 
somewhat unruly—town quarter of Kasımpaşa was the motivation for 
locating the palazzo on this site; however, such a concern may have been 
of some importance nonetheless.
By contrast, for semi-finished goods, the administration relied on small 
independent producers, whose work it could not supervise, and quality 
control devolved upon a limited group of merchants and officials. In the 
21 Ibid.: 130–31.
22 Ibid.: 78–81.
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1500s and 1600s, this system worked well enough. For even after major 
disasters such as the Battle of Lepanto (1571), the sultan had new ships 
built with great rapidity, and we do not hear that sailcloth, cordage or 
timber caused bottlenecks severe enough to hold up the enterprise.
Centralised Production: The Cannon Foundry and the 
Manufacture of Gunpowder
Another centralised workshop was the cannon foundry which in its 
eighteenth-century incarnation still towers over the Tophane quarter and 
the adjacent waters of the Bosporus. On the production of cannons, the 
work of Gabor Ágoston has dispelled the notion common in much previous 
Orientalist scholarship, that the Ottomans were technologically inferior to 
European armies already from the late Middle Ages. More particularly, the 
sultans’ commanders supposedly continued to use very large guns when the 
latter were becoming obsolete in European armies.23 By contrast, Ágoston 
has shown that while Ottoman military authorities certainly produced large 
guns, these were often mainly for display; and according to Evliya Çelebi 
(1611–after 1683), it was a source of pride that no one but the Ottoman 
monarch possessed cannons of great size.24 On board ship, however, several 
smaller guns normally flanked the largest specimen. In the case of mortars 
too, the Ottomans did not greatly differ from their European opponents, 
producing a variety of bombshells, from large to very small items.
As noted, Evliya Çelebi has produced a detailed description of the cannon 
foundry; and despite present-day historians’ reservations concerning the 
author’s often rather cavalier use of his sources, this account emphasises 
aspects that official documents almost never discuss, including the 
significance of ritual at the worksite. Apparently, the manufacturers tried to 
counter the risks inherent in their work by elaborate prayers and invocations 
of God. Given the risks involved in foundries of any kind, rituals were 
important outside of the Islamic world as well. In 1798–99, the German poet 
Friedrich von Schiller wrote a poem in which the founding of a bell took 
centre stage, with the ritual functions of the artefact—the announcement 
of peace in a war-torn world—the raison d’être of the entire enterprise. 25
23 Ágoston, Guns for the Sultan: 61–95.
24 Ibid.: 74.
25 Tunç, Tophane-i Amire ve Osmanlı Devletinde Top Döküm Faaliyetleri. For the text of 
Schiller’s long poem, see http://www.kombu.de/glocke.htm (accessed on 8 August 2014).
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In Evliya’s time, there was still no centralised gunpowder workshop 
(baruthane); and manufacture took place in an array of smaller workshops, 
although the central armoury (cebehane) was responsible for coordination. 
Thus, information often is available mainly for campaigns or insecure 
situations in the borderlands, when the bureaucrats serving the central 
administration recorded the amounts of gunpowder that the armies would 
receive. Or else remarkable calamities might make it into the record, such 
as the explosion of the Buda manufactory in 1578, with thousands of 
lives lost; in response, the sultan had the provincial governor executed.26 
Moreover, as an adjustment to changing battlefield techniques, in the late 
1500s and throughout the 1600s, the descendants of cavalrymen no longer 
in active service might retain their privileges by supplying saltpetre to 
the Ottoman armies. In the 1500s and 1600s, the sultan’s armies were 
autarchic with respect to gunpowder; and they became so again after the 
technical innovations of the late eighteenth century.
As a centralised institution, the baruthane is a product of the eighteenth 
century; but even in the 1700s, the manufacture of gunpowder continued 
on provincial sites too, especially in places near the frontier. Thus, during 
the Iranian wars following the overthrow of the Safavids, there were 
attempts, perhaps but moderately successful, to establish a gunpowder 
manufacture in the border fortress of Van.27 Gunpowder might travel over 
fairly long distances, with even some Egyptian gunpowder arriving in the 
Istanbul arsenals.28 Moreover, in the Ottoman capital, private gunpowder 
mills operated as well, though often seriously challenged by officialdom; 
among other items, they produced explosives for fireworks.
Debates concerning the Ottoman use of gunpowder resemble the 
discussions about cannons, to which we have previously referred. Ágoston 
has stressed that throughout early modern Europe, the composition 
of gunpowder was highly variable, and that in the late 1600s, French 
and Ottoman gunpowder contained identical proportions of saltpetre, 
charcoal and sulphur.29 But in quantitative terms, the Ottoman armies of 
the eighteenth century fell behind; and in the late 1700s, the government 
imported gunpowder even from distant Sweden, until the restructuring 
of the local industry finally solved the problem.
26 Gölen, Osmanlı Devleti'nde Baruthane-i Amire: 17–18. 
27 Genç, Lale Devrinde Savaş: 131–32.
28 Gölen, Osmanlı Devleti'nde Baruthane-i Amire: 20.
29 Ágoston, Osmanlı’da Strateji ve Askerî Güç: 148–49.
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As for the dispersion of gunpowder production in different places and 
workshops, with variations in quality as a result, Ágoston has pointed out 
that the Ottomans were in the same position as their northern and western 
rivals. Put differently, the coexistence of centralised and dispersed 
workshops, a major topic of this article, was not a serious problem for the 
sultan’s armies. At the same time, Ágoston has shown that the technology 
gap often attributed to the Ottomans by European observers occurred later 
and was much less serious than often claimed. Concordantly, Virginia 
Aksan, another contributor to the debate, has focused not on technology 
at all, but on the fact that the Ottoman elite was unwilling to fully 
integrate the numerous Albanian, Caucasian or Kurdish fighters, many of 
them mercenaries, on whose military labour the army had come to rely. 
In addition, sultans and viziers for a long time proved unable to compensate 
for the janissaries’ loss of fighting power.30 Findings concerning the role 
of private manufacture and relative parity between the Ottomans and their 
European opponents well into the 1700s are part of the ‘anti-Orientalist’ 
discourse, the centrepiece of present-day Ottomanist historiography.
An Interlude: Technology Transfers
In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, however, the balance of power 
had changed and a series of defeats, especially against Russia, induced the 
Ottoman sultans and their senior servitors to seriously revamp the armies 
and especially the technological training of the higher officers. This question 
has long been a favourite of historians working within the paradigm of 
‘imperial decline, followed by a limited revival due to increased contact 
with Europe’, which was dominant during the 1950s and 1960s.
But in recent years, historians have attempted to deal with the question 
using other approaches less tainted by association with ‘Orientalism’. 
Historians of Ottoman science have pointed out that certain members of 
the religious cum juridical establishment (ulema) were quite willing to 
take an interest in scientific ‘imports’ from Europe.31 Thus, Gelenbevi 
İsmail Efendi (1730–91) combined a career as a religious scholar with a 
teaching position at the Mühendishane-i Bahr-i Hümayun, the school for 
naval engineers that the Grand Admiral Gazi Hasan Paşa had founded, 
30 Aksan, ‘Breaking the Spell of the Baron de Tott’.
31 Umut, ‘İsmail Gelenbevi at the Engineering School’.
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with the Baron de Tott as spiritus rector (1775). İsmail Efendi may have 
had influential patrons who helped him obtain this position. But once in 
office, he threw himself into the study of the European-style mathematics 
that naval engineers and artillery specialists would require.32
In his thesis on Gelenbevi İsmail Efendi, Hasan Umut has rightly 
pointed out that engineering schools were something of a novelty in 
eighteenth-century Central Europe as well; and he has focused on the 
establishment of the ‘new’ profession of engineering and the emergence 
of an ‘intercultural’ scientific community. For a short while, it seemed as if 
some members of the religious cum juridical establishment would join this 
community, before the bifurcation of education after the mid-1800s cut off 
this possibility.33 Dealing with a period that is partly contemporaneous with 
the lifespan of İsmail Gelenbevi, Darina Martykánová in her dissertation 
on the emergence of the Ottoman engineering profession, in both its civil/
civilian and its military branches, has taken a similar approach.
Certainly officialdom was always somewhat sceptical towards non-Muslim 
engineers; for as noted, originally engineering had been a military activity, 
and it was the role of the army to defend—and if possible expand—the realm 
of Islam. However, with the growing need for engineers to produce roads, 
water systems and other non-military public works, engineering became 
a profession accessible to people of different faiths, often graduates of a 
limited number of schools.34 At the time when the present overview comes 
to an end in the late eighteenth and very early nineteenth centuries, a process 
thus had begun which by the late 1800s was to result in a degree of common 
consciousness among Ottoman engineers. Whatever their religion, the latter 
now saw themselves as differing in their roles and identities from their French 
or German colleagues, or even in opposition to the foreigners. However, the 
wars of the early twentieth century soon tore apart this emergent community.
The Mint
Monographs covering the Ottoman financial bureaucracy have a lengthy 
history. However, the role of the mint as an enterprise is quite marginal 
to these studies. Apart from the various catalogues of coin collections 
32 Ibid.: 51–55.
33 For religious scholars’ teaching geometry, see Martykánová, Reconstructing Ottoman 
Engineers: 104.
34 Ibid.: 3–14, 140–43, 180–85.
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and the fundamental studies of Ottoman money by Halil Sahillioğlu and 
Şevket Pamuk, the basis for our discussion is, therefore, the very recent 
study by Ömerül Faruk Bölükbaşı, based on his doctoral dissertation.35
The author has set himself the task of figuring out how in the roughly 
100 years between the mid-1700s, when the mint became a treasury in 
its own right, and the currency reform of 1844, Ottoman officials and 
their aides produced the local coinage in the physical sense of the term. 
For this purpose, the author has focused on the people serving the mint 
in various capacities and the manner in which they secured the gold and 
silver necessary for their work. In addition, Bölükbaşı has discussed 
the interventions of the newly formed ‘treasury of the sultanic mint’ in 
the politics and economic life of the empire, put differently its role in 
procuring more or less short-term revenues. As these latter issues are not 
really germane to our topic, we will deal only with the first section of 
Bölükbaşı’s work.36
At the top of the Ottoman mint, there was a set of bureaucrats chosen 
from among the scribes of the sultan’s council (divan-ı hümayun) headed 
by the supervisor of the mint (darbhane nazırı or darbhane emini); in the 
1700s, these people were appointed for a year, although the appointment 
was extendable. The darbhane nazırı was a member of the highest level 
of the bureaucracy; and some former holders of the office even rose to 
the position of grand vizier. Under this, all-Muslim corps of officials 
there served various non-Muslims, who in the eighteenth century were 
normally Armenians. While of a much lower rank in comparison to the 
Muslim administrators, the latter exercised considerable power when as 
co-called purchasers (mübayaacı) they visited shops, markets and fairs 
to purchase gold and silver for the mint, at prices determined by the 
sultan’s administrators. Presumably they could count on official backing 
if confronted with owners unwilling to sell at the prices offered; and if in 
a provincial venue, a person claimed that the mübayaacıs [the purchasers 
working for the Ottoman sultans] had acquired gold or silver by illegal 
means, the complainant had to take his case to Istanbul. Thus, the level of 
protection these purchasers enjoyed appeared as a virtual immunity.37 In a 
35 Bölükbaşı, 18. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Darphane-i Amire; Pamuk, A Monetary History 
of the Ottoman Empire; Tabakoğlu, ‘Bir İktisatçı-Tarihçi Olarak Halil Sahillioğlu’.
36 Bölükbaşı, 18. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Darphane-i Amire: XVII–XVIII.
37 Ibid.: 75–76.
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different perspective, the sultan’s bureaucrats may have used non-Muslims 
to deflect the hostility, which might arise from the purchase of gold and 
silver at prices that the owners considered unacceptable.
Even after the eighteenth-century centralising policies had taken 
effect, the supply of silver available to the mint largely depended on the 
cooperation of money changers (sarrafs); for quite a few foreign coins 
circulated in Ottoman markets. The sarrafs collected domestic and foreign 
coins arriving from the provinces as tax payments, and passed them on 
to the mint for re-coining. As the prices that the sarrafs received from 
these deals were lower than the market price of silver, they sought and 
found other ways of making profits. In addition, these businessmen were 
supposed to purchase underweight coins at market value and deliver 
them to the mint, although some of them used the money thus collected 
for speculative purposes. The system apparently worked well enough in 
normal times; however, during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-74, many 
taxpayers were unable to pay, with the sarrafs maintaining that under these 
circumstances they could not discharge their obligations to the treasury.38
The mint not only depended on the cooperation of Istanbul’s 
businessmen for its supplies of silver, but the institution also made extra 
money by selling precious metals to craftsmen such as the manufacturers 
of fine wire used by brocade weavers, to say nothing of goldsmiths 
and silversmiths.39 Following a centuries-long tradition, the Ottoman 
government was ever suspicious of gold and silver stocks in the hands of 
its subjects and by means of the sultanic mint attempted to limit the amount 
of precious metal allowed to the empire’s artisans. Time and again, the 
latter were forbidden to pass on gold or silver to those of their colleagues 
who—as everybody knew—operated on the margins or even outside the 
system of controls that the authorities had put in place.
But even in this sector, where state demands had high priority, local 
artisans and businessmen, especially if operating outside of Istanbul, found 
ways and means of circumventing regulations. As a testimony to this kind of 
inventiveness, we might refer to the many pieces of silverware that Orthodox 
donors, artisan guilds among them, dedicated to their churches especially in 
the late 1700s and early 1800s, at a time when the mint in Istanbul enjoyed 
unprecedented powers of control, and inspections must have proliferated.
38 Ibid.: 87–92.
39 Ibid.: 92–100.
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Public Building Projects as Centralised Enterprises
As noted before, the construction of the Süleymaniye was a well-
documented project, completed in seven to eight years during the mid-
1500s.40 We also possess a good deal of information on the construction 
of the Sultan Ahmed mosque, another gigantic complex that took only 
11 years to build. In both cases, the period of construction is on record in 
the documents instituting the two sultans’ pious foundation (vakfiyye); in 
the Ottoman world, all mosques and other charities took the legal form 
of a pious foundation.
Digging on the site of the Sultan Ahmed mosque commenced in the fall 
of 1609, with the foundation stone laid in early 1610. While the mosque 
opened in 1617, certain auxiliary buildings were complete only by 1620 
well after the death of the young sultan.41 Throughout, the architect or 
rather—by his mediation—the sultan’s treasury paid the expenses of 
construction. But this arrangement did not mean that all needs of the 
building site were centrally produced: smaller enterprises took part in the 
process as well, as officials purchased quite a few semi-finished materials 
such as nails, glass or bricks ready-made from Istanbul manufacturers. 
Officials even had invented different terms for bricks and roof-tiles derived 
from these two sources: either they were miri, put differently they belonged 
to the fiscal administration, or else they were harici, or to use a modern 
term, ‘outsourced’.42 Once again, the construction site was a venture in 
which the dominant political authority used the services of many small 
enterprises. We know, more or less, how much money some of the latter 
received; but as we have only a very general notion of the contemporary 
price level, it is hard to tell whether working in an enterprise serving a 
sultanic construction site of the early 1600s was profitable or loss-making.
For the mid-eighteenth century, there exist accounts relevant to 
the construction of another great mosque, namely the Nuruosmaniye, 
remarkable because after the completion of the Sultan Ahmed mosque in 
1617, no Ottoman monarch had established a major pious foundation in 
the central district of Istanbul. Ahmed III (r. 1703–30) was the only ruler 
to build at all, and the mosque put up in honour of his mother was on the 
40 Barkan, Süleymaniye Cami ve Imareti Inşaatı.
41 Nayır, Osmanlı Mimarlığında Sultan Ahmet Külliyesi ve Sonrası: 46.
42 Ibid.: 102.
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distant Asiatic seaboard, in Üsküdar. Perhaps after both Ahmed III and the 
latter’s predecessor had lost their thrones due to urban uprisings, Sultan 
Mahmud I (r. 1730–54) considered that the monarchy needed to be more 
present in the central sections of Istanbul. Probably not by chance, the 
new mosque thus lay across the street from one of the main gates to 
the covered bazaar. Sultan Mahmud died shortly before completion of 
the complex, and his brother Osman III (r. 1754–57) was on the throne 
when the mosque became operational in 1755.
In the diary covering the construction process written by an otherwise 
unknown scribe named Ahmed, we find a few remarks about the way 
in which officials were to treat construction workers, an issue barely 
mentioned in most other accounts. Thus, the author records that the bina 
emini or representative of the sultan on site had received orders to ensure 
that the workmen received their wages on time, and that nobody would 
dare to mistreat them claiming the particular urgency of the project.43 
We may conclude that administrators might withhold payment and push 
the workmen into labouring faster, with safety precautions falling by 
the wayside. Unfortunately, Ahmed the scribe has not referred to the 
involvement of outside enterprises in the procurement of semi-finished 
materials. Perhaps the sultan had decided to minimise ‘outsourcing’, or else 
the author had no interest in matters not directly controlled by his office.
In addition to complexes of mosques and other charities, the Ottoman 
authorities focused on fortresses. Some of the latter were part of a pre-
Ottoman heritage; and Ottoman military men apparently did not regard 
fortifications adapted to the age of cannon fire as indispensable under 
every circumstance. In the steppe borderlands where Ottomans, Tatars, 
Cossacks and Poles or Lithuanians so often clashed, armies did not always 
carry cannons. Therefore, the Ottomans did not completely rebuild some 
of the mediaeval-style castles they had taken over, including the famous 
fortress of Akkerman on the Dniester, where the only adaptation to the 
gunpowder age consisted of thickening the walls.44
Archaeological study has supplemented the analysis of archival 
documents. While Victor Ostapchuk and Svitlana Bilyayeva have published 
an extensive study of Akkerman (Bilhorod-Dnistrowskyj in Ukraine), 
43 Hochhut, Die Moschee Nûruosmâniye in Istanbul: 20.
44 Ostapchuk and Bilyayeva, ‘The Ottoman Black Sea Frontier at Akkerman Fortress’: 
142–45.
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Hungarian scholars have not only worked on the more important castles in 
present-day Hungary but have also investigated the smaller forts (palanka).45 
These studies have brought to light not only the defensive concerns of 
their builders but also the ‘nitty-gritty’ of life in such places, including 
the availability of modest luxuries such as coffee cups and tobacco pipes. 
Unfortunately for our purposes, by the time Ottoman officials began 
compiling the great registers characteristic of the 1700s, the sultans had 
lost Hungary, so that in this case we cannot bring together archaeological 
and archival data in the same way as Ostapchuk and Bilyayeva have done.
In the early 1700s, the Ottoman administration still recruited workmen 
according to principles already in evidence during the mid-1500s: judges 
and local administrators received orders to draft artisans to work on a 
given project; and according to sultanic law, the men selected could not 
refuse to go.46 At the end of the project, they might return home, although 
presumably, quite a few of them died before their release. Or else, given 
the hardships of travel, survivors might prefer to stay in the locality where 
they had laboured as draftees. Some Istanbul workmen might receive 
what amounted to an order of banishment to a remote border fortress. For 
in the eighteenth century, most members of the Ottoman administration 
had become convinced that the capital was overcrowded, and that it was 
necessary to reduce the population. Men living in the capital without their 
families appeared as particularly suspicious characters. On their return, 
young men sent to work on remote fortresses might fail to locate witnesses 
proving their status as Istanbul residents; at least legally, they might thus 
be unable to re-enter the city. Possibly, repairs to remote border fortresses 
served a double purpose: apart from the actual project, they could serve 
as a pretext to remove men considered undesirable by the authorities.47
Centralised Control over Decentralised Workshops:  
The Ehl-i Hiref
Outside of the construction sector, the Ottoman palace seemingly preferred 
indirect forms of control. The sultans’ officials employed artists and 
artisans, often on an ad hoc basis; as noted, these people received quarterly 
45 Gerelyes and Kovács, Archaeology of the Ottoman Period in Hungary.
46 Barkan, Süleymaniye Cami ve Imareti Inşaatı: 94–97.
47 Faroqhi, ‘Controlling Borders and Workmen, All in One Fell Swoop’.
Making Things to Serve Sultans, Viziers and Army Commanders  19
The Medieval History Journal, 21, 1 (2018): 1–31 
payments, and thus they were available whenever the palace needed 
their services. In the early 1500s, many artists cum artisans were from 
the Iranian cultural world, though not necessarily ethnic Iranians. Selim 
I (r. 1512–20) after his victory over Shah Ismā’īl (1514) brought a number 
of artists and artisans from Tabriz to Istanbul, where they seemingly trained 
local men, sometimes originating from the Balkans. For around 1500, the 
Ottoman elite highly appreciated the aesthetic norms current in the various 
Timurid palaces, particularly Herat and pre-Safavid Tabriz.48 However, 
Iranian models remained influential in Ottoman luxury production well 
into the 1700s and beyond.
In the sixteenth century, the Ottoman palace began to sponsor a ‘design 
office’ (nakkaşhane) whose masters invented decorative features that found 
application in various media, including textiles, books and faience.49 At one 
time, the relevant artists apparently used a disaffected Byzantine church 
dedicated to St. John, one of the several churches known by this name and 
located near the sultans’ palace. Supposedly, the artists occupied the upper 
story and the sultans’ menagerie the lower one; if true, this situation may 
indicate that the prestige of the designers was not very high.50 Whatever 
the truth, the closeness of the nakkaşhane to the Topkapı Sarayı indicates 
constant referrals to palace authorities. However, Emine Fetvacı has 
shown that the sultan in person was not necessarily the patron; as noted 
in a different context, high court officials often served as intermediaries 
sponsoring the manufacture of valuable objects.51
Apparently, the design office did not demand dependent artisans to 
set up shop in the immediate vicinity. Presumably, when a given design 
reached, for instance, a master weaver of silk cloth, he would have had 
the freedom—and the responsibility—of adapting the design, so that the 
resulting fabric would hang properly.52 Perhaps fabrics, tile work, faience 
plates and manuscript illuminations all followed similar styles not merely 
because of orders ‘from above’ but also because elite customers wanted 
their possessions to exhibit the latest court styles. But on this issue, we 
do not have much information.
48 Uzunçarşılı, ‘Osmanlı Sarayında Ehl-i Hiref (Sanatkârlar) Defteri’.
49 Bağcı, Çağman, Renda and Tanındı, Osmanlı Resim Sanatı.
50 Eyice, ‘Arslanhane’.
51 Fetvacı, Picturing History at the Ottoman Court: 59.
52 Rogers, ‘Ottoman Luxury Trades and Their Regulation’: 145.
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Recent research has pointed to the probable role of highly decorated 
manuscripts in spreading the emergent imperial style in miniature 
painting.53 Certainly, these manuscripts were in the treasury, but here they 
were accessible not only to the sultans but to high-level palace dignitaries 
too; and these were the ‘multipliers’ who spread the image of a highly 
organised, hierarchical and—by the same token—serving the Ottoman 
monarchs.
After a possible eclipse during the sultans’ sojourn in Edirne in the 
second half of the seventeenth century, the employment of artists and 
artisans by the palace (ehl-i hiref) seems to have revived and continued 
throughout the 1700s. However, a growing number of patrons and 
diversifying tastes might well have reduced the influence of designs 
created by court-sponsored artists. After all, by the eighteenth century, the 
trend was not towards the gigantic mosque complexes once sponsored by 
Mehmed II (r. 1431–81), Süleyman or Ahmed I, but towards a large number 
of smaller charities instituted by members of the elite, whose smaller size 
has often detracted from their variety and elegance. Even if their influence 
had declined, some ehl-i hiref served the sultans throughout the 1700s.
Centralised Control over Decentralised Workshops 
(Case No. 1): Manufacturing Tiles in İznik
It is still not clear why from the late 1400s onwards the small town of 
İznik became a centre of fine glazed faience. For while suitable clay was 
available a short distance away, clay was only a very minor ingredient 
in the white material from which the potters made İznik faience; much 
more important was ground-up glass, a recycled product available mainly 
in towns. Chargers, bowls and beakers were important products of this 
manufacture; in addition, Ottoman patrons also commissioned large panels 
with which, following the Timurid and Seljuk examples, they decorated 
mosques, other important charities and the sultan’s palace as well.
In sixteenth-century faience, most designs remained in fashion only 
for a few years, and their bewildering variety, as well as their sequence 
in time, forms the subject matter of the landmark study of İznik pottery 
by Nurhan Atasoy and Julian Raby.54 Under Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512) 
53 Fetvacı, Picturing History at the Ottoman Court: 83.
54 Atasoy and Raby, Iznik: The Pottery of Ottoman Turkey.
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the ‘Master of the Knots’ was active, followed by the ‘Master of the 
Lotuses’, who worked under Selim I (r. 1512–20).55 For the long reign 
of Sultan Süleyman, Atasoy and Raby have made out a vast number of 
designs, some of which flourished simultaneously, while others followed 
upon one another, remaining in favour for 15–25 years. Furthermore, in 
this period, Ottoman potters and their patrons much appreciated Chinese 
porcelain, mainly blue and white, which mostly arrived in the sultans’ 
territories by way of the Hejaz. After 1535, important painters who also 
worked in other media, such as Kara Memi, captured the favour of the 
court to such an extent that their drawings ‘invaded’ İznik pottery as well.
In the later sixteenth century, Atasoy and Raby have discerned ‘revivals’ 
of earlier styles; but at the same time, the so-called ‘florists’ flowers including 
tulips, hyacinths, prunus blossom and carnations were dominant design 
features. Moreover, during the second half of the century, potters developed 
a bright coral red, a colour previously unknown to faience artists. Difficult 
to manufacture, faience ornamented with red motifs disappeared during the 
early seventeenth century. When between 1638 and 1640, the powerful Queen 
Mother (valide sultan) Mahpeyker Kösem had her mosque decorated with a 
variety of faiences, those ornamented with red motifs were extremely rare.
Many unsolved questions surround the decline of the potteries after 
about 1600. Julian Raby has suggested that as Chinese import porcelain 
became more widespread, market demand for İznik faience contracted—
and, in fact, broken Chinese cups have occurred in excavations in former 
Ottoman Hungary.56 In addition, the palace demanded large quantities of 
tiles for the panels to ornament mosques and palaces, requiring potters 
to put aside work for the market.57 The creativity of these artisans 
suffered, because the designs of panels often came from Istanbul, while 
the incredible variability of decorations on plates and bowls presumably 
owed much to the capabilities of local masters.58 Official policy thus forced 
potters to concentrate on a few designs easy to reproduce, and thus stifled 
creativity. While potters in Kütahya made items ‘for the shallow pocket’ 
throughout the 1500s, 1600s and 1700s, production in İznik was already 
quite insignificant in the mid-1600s, when Evliya Çelebi visited the site.59
55 Atasoy and Raby, Iznik: The Pottery of Ottoman Turkey: 8–9.
56 Atasoy and Raby, Iznik: The Pottery of Ottoman Turkey: 285.
57 Atasoy and Raby, Iznik: The Pottery of Ottoman Turkey: 63.
58 Nayır, Osmanlı Mimarlığında Sultan Ahmet Külliyesi ve Sonrası: 91. 
59 Atasoy and Raby, Iznik: The Pottery of Ottoman Turkey: 63.
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Centralised Control over Decentralised Workshops 
(Case No. 2): Weavers in Salonika
Among decentralised workshops under central control, the best known 
case is that of the Jewish manufacturers of woollen cloth in Salonika. 
These artisans had provided the janissaries with uniform cloaks ever 
since their arrival in the late 1400s, when Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, 
after conquering the last Muslim principality in 1492, set about enforcing 
religious uniformity and as a first step expelled the Jewish population.60
Sultan Bayezid II accepted the new immigrants, probably because 
of the working capital as well as the technical and commercial know-
how that the newcomers would bring to his recently enlarged empire.61 
In particular, the manufacture of woollen cloth of a certain quality was 
not widespread in the sultan’s territories; and janissary officers may well 
have regarded the rough woollens (aba) worn by peasants and shepherds 
as unsuitable for personages of rank. Mostly, the new arrivals settled in 
Istanbul and Salonika, setting up textile workshops within the walls of the 
latter city. From the early 1500s, the Jews of Salonika needed to deliver 
specified quantities of standard-quality woollens to the sultans’ armies.
Ottoman official records reflect some of the difficulties involved: when 
plague epidemics were rife, not a rare misfortune, the weavers would try to 
leave the congested city and spread out over the countryside. Their survival 
being in the official interest as well, the administration in Istanbul normally 
permitted these moves. However, local administrators, presumably with 
the excuse that the weavers’ dispersal would increase ‘administrative 
overhead’, demanded large sums of money before permitting the 
unfortunate manufacturers to leave Salonika.62 Furthermore, the attempt 
of the weavers to secure the intervention of the Istanbul authorities must 
have caused further delays.
During most of the sixteenth century, Salonika’s manufacturers received 
some payment from the treasury; but they also needed to sell in the open 
market as this remuneration did not suffice for subsistence. Apparently, 
potential customers were mostly people ‘of modest substance’, as the poor 
60 For the first study using Ottoman documents, see Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı Devleti 
Teşkilâtından Kapukulu Ocakları.
61 Veinstein, ‘L’établissement des juifs d’Espagne dans l’Empire ottoman’.
62 Faroqhi, ‘Textile Production in Rumeli and the Arab Provinces’.
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could not have afforded anything better than rough woollens (aba), and 
the rich preferred silk fabrics opulently lined with fur.
However, by the late 1500s, Salonika cloth competed in the open 
market only with difficulty. After all, while the financial crisis from which 
the empire suffered during those years limited demand, the price of raw 
wool increased precipitously.63 Growing demand was the major reason: 
for in the late 1500s and early 1600s, the manufacture of woollen cloth 
then flourishing in Venice relied largely on Balkan wool. Moreover, when 
this industry declined during the first half of the seventeenth century, 
Dutch and French buyers entered the market, so that prices decreased 
only to a limited extent.64 A prohibition to export raw wool, which should 
have been advantageous to the Salonika manufacturers, existed mainly 
‘on paper’. Remarkably, the government did not insist too much on 
enforcement, although export prohibitions had a well-established place 
in the ‘economic’ thinking of the Ottoman elite.65 Additionally, around 
1600 English woollens entered the Ottoman market in force; while these 
imports were not necessarily cheaper than Salonika cloth, they were often 
of reasonable quality and therefore ‘good value for money’, putting further 
pressure on local producers.
Lastly, the manufacturers had to contend with growing demand from the 
janissary corps, whose membership grew dramatically in the late 1500s; 
and an impecunious Ottoman treasury increasingly paid in depreciated 
currency and/or demanded deliveries of woollen cloths in lieu of taxes. 
Because of these combined pressures, after about 1650 Salonika woollens 
disappeared from the clothing chests of elite Ottomans. Sometimes 
manufacturers responded to the crisis by lowering the quality of their cloth. 
However, this reaction carried risks of its own; at one time in the 1600s, 
a Jewish dignitary was executed because of the low-quality textiles that 
the government had received.
More commonly, weavers fled to Izmir or to places in nearby 
Macedonia, where they were under no obligation to deliver woollen cloth. 
As a testimony to this migration, there survive the records of a court 
case involving the Jewish community of Salonika and that of Karaferye 
(today: Veroia or Veria) in northern Greece, where certain weavers after 
63 Braude, ‘International Competition and Domestic Cloth in the Ottoman Empire’.
64 Ibid.: 446.
65 Faroqhi, ‘Textile Production in Rumeli and the Arab Provinces’: 70.
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their flight from Salonika were making cheap woollens for a popular 
clientele. The manufacturers of Salonika demanded that their opponents 
should return ‘home’ to shoulder their part of the manufacturing burden. 
In response, the weavers from Karaferye claimed that they had been living 
in this town from time immemorial, and their colleagues from Salonika 
had no claim on them at all. Finally, the Ottoman authorities permitted a 
small number of weavers to stay and ordered the others to return to their 
(alleged) hometown.66 While the manufacture of woollens in Salonika 
was no longer viable after the mid-1600s or even earlier, some Jewish 
weavers continued to work as an appendage to the janissary corps until 
the abolition of the latter in 1826.
Decentralised—and Successful—Workshops Without 
Much Central Control
Evidently, in the case of Salonika’s woollen weavers, the supervision of 
small manufacturers by the sultan’s officials did very little to protect the 
industry. On the other hand, workshops in the small arms sector, where 
official involvement was minimal, did quite well. Unfortunately, limited 
bureaucratic input means that sources are very scarce.
Inscriptions and other decorations on surviving handguns (tüfeng or 
tüfek) and pistols have turned out to be a major resource for the craft 
historian.67 Furthermore, some information emerges from the published 
and unpublished inventories covering Ottoman fortresses, dating to the 
years after 1450.68 In Ottoman castles, handguns were in use already in 
1455; and Christian garrison soldiers being quite common during this 
early period, we frequently find non-Muslim subjects of the sultans 
serving as handgunners. Among janissaries, the adoption of handguns 
went back even further, with the first instances on record in the reign of 
Murad II (r. 1421–51, with interruptions). In 1605, janissaries stationed in 
Hungary engaged in volley practice, a type of shooting often associated 
with the—much debated—‘European military revolution’ of the early 
modern period.69
66 Gara, ‘Çuha for the Janissaries’.
67 Elgood is fundamental but does not deal with Anatolia, and but marginally with Istanbul.
68 Ágoston, ‘Firearms and Military Adaptation: The Ottomans and the European Military 
Revolution, 1450–1800’: 94.
69 Ibid.: 97–98.
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Handguns were typically the work of private gunsmiths: regional styles 
from the Balkans have attracted particular attention.70 The area of Boka 
Kotorska (around Kotor/Croatia, Cattaro in Italian) had a reputation for 
highly ornamented handguns known as džeferdar and documented since 
the late 1600s; some items bore dates and/or the names of the makers.71 
Connections to Italy, especially the Venetian town of Brescia, were close; 
and some owners of firearms from the Balkans attached locks of European 
manufacture to their guns. Conversely, European owners of muskets were 
eager to acquire and use Ottoman gun barrels.72 Contemporary observers 
felt that the latter were of much superior quality, as the barrels consisted 
of sheets of metal coiled into spirals, a technique limiting the risk of 
explosion. Interestingly, Mughal sources have attributed this invention 
to the imperial workshops of Akbar.73
Private gunsmiths being numerous, Ottoman subjects wanting handguns 
should have found them without too much trouble. Particularly the 
irregular soldiers (sekban, sarıca, levend) hired for single campaigns 
and receiving no armaments must have relied on these private sources 
of supply. Moreover, quite a few users claimed that the guns made in 
smaller workshops were of superior quality. Serving—at least partly—
as advertisements, the inscriptions mentioning gunsmiths’ names and 
other particulars reflected a growing self-confidence on the part of the 
manufacturing artisans.
However, around 1600, the easy availability of handguns worried 
the authorities; for by now, the sultans’ armed forces could not claim 
a ‘firearms monopoly’. A spate of prohibitions against selling tüfek to 
the subject population was the result, together with much-advertised 
campaigns to collect those guns already in circulation.74 However, these 
prohibitions were probably of limited effectiveness. Firstly, as noted, the 
Ottoman army employed irregulars needing to buy their own weaponry 
and secondly, handguns were quite easy to hide. Thus, in many regions, 
possessing not only swords and sabres, but firearms as well, became a 
significant part of male identity.
70 Elgood, passim.
71 Ibid.: 72–89.
72 Ágoston, ‘Firearms and Military Adaptation: The Ottomans and the European Military 
Revolution, 1450–1800’: 106.
73 Habib, A People’s History of India.
74 Inalcik, ‘The Socio-political Effects of the Diffusion of Firearms’.
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Conclusion
When compared to the polities of mediaeval Europe, the Ottoman 
administration of the late 1400s and especially the 1500s certainly 
seemed a model of centralism. This aspect has fascinated historians 
of the twentieth—and even of the twenty-first—century, because they 
often continue regard centralisation as the hallmark of the modern state. 
While a few pioneering scholars, particularly Rifa’at Abou-El-Haj, have 
emphasised the marked difference between ‘early modern’ and ‘modern’ 
centralisation, historians should take this difference more seriously than 
they have done to date.75 Certainly, Ottoman documents encourage scholars 
to emphasise centralism, as they focus on the undertakings of the central 
administration and leave in the shadow the activities of less powerful 
figures, including merchants and artisans. At an earlier stage of research, 
it was common for historians to simply follow wherever their documents 
led them; and researchers with little knowledge of the historiography will 
adhere to this custom to the present day.
However, scholars with—hopefully—a greater degree of sophistication 
will formulate their own questions which at first glance cannot be 
answered by the documentation at hand. However, the latter sometimes 
provides clues to the informed reader. Put differently, it is important to 
focus on things that the authors of the texts at issue say in passing, but 
that the reader will miss if he/she does not approach the sources with pre-
formulated questions in mind. My present search for the role of more or 
less independent artisans in the functioning of large centralised workshops 
is a modest attempt in this direction. I have also tried to highlight the role 
of such craftsmen (or in the case of the silk manufactures: craftspeople) 
in the complicated operation of supplying the palace with luxury goods.
For we still know very little about the entrepreneurs who might, 
voluntarily or not, contract to deliver semi-finished materials such as gold 
thread, silk yarns ready for weaving, but also hewn stones, bricks or faience 
tiles. Archival documents typically mention entrepreneurial artisans only 
if something went wrong. However, centralised worksites could not have 
functioned without these more or less independent producers. An example 
may prove the point: when from the 1600s onwards, independent kiln owners 
and faience masters found that official patronage had decreased and/or the 
75 Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the Ottoman State: 5–18.
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government had limited their access to the market, many of them quite 
simply left the business. Sultans and viziers wishing to ornament high-profile 
mosque complexes could not change this situation; and they coped with it 
as best they could, often reusing older tiles. It would be most illuminating 
if one day, we were to find a source discussing how eighteenth-century 
personages actually felt about the reuse of artwork from a bygone age.
Furthermore, the roles of middlemen on different levels of society 
need further study as well. We may assume that modest silk weavers 
or tile manufacturers did not have direct access to the patrons that 
might order their work. Julian Raby has suggested that some of these 
middlemen, ordered to procure large quantities of decorated tiles, filled 
their storehouses with items in a more or less standardised stylistic idiom.76 
These middlemen/faience traders certainly helped diffuse the work of the 
İznik potters; however, at the same time, their demand for standardised 
decoration stifled the initiative of the manufacturers. We know very little 
about the role of such middlemen in other types of luxury production.
With respect to high-quality goods intended for the elite, twentieth- and 
twenty-first-century historians have argued, and continue to argue, about 
the models for the novelties that eighteenth-century Ottoman patrons, 
architects and practitioners of the decorative arts may have adopted or else 
rejected. In all probability, the availability—or otherwise—of small and 
poorly documented workshops capable of fulfilling the patrons’ orders had 
a significant share in determining the choices of these high-level figures.
To show up the limits of our knowledge, we end this account with an at 
least partly unresolved question, dealing with the production of cannons 
and other armaments. On the one hand, Mehmet Genç has pointed out 
that the demands of eighteenth-century warfare fell most heavily on the 
more prosperous workshops.77 Officials must have found it easier to make 
demands on a few large entrepreneurs than on a multitude of small ones; 
and they could justify this procedure by the need to protect the poor, 
always a potent element in any legitimising discourse.
As a result, lack of capital, a case for concern already in peacetime, 
became dire during and after the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768–74. 
Admittedly even before this confrontation, food and money to pay the 
76 Atasoy and Raby, Iznik: The Pottery of Ottoman Turkey: 287.
77 Genç, ‘Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Savaş’; Genç, ‘L'économie ottomane et la guerre au 
XVIIIème siècle’.
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Ottoman soldiery was sometimes erratic. On the other hand, before about 
1750, the sultans’ military machine was still well ahead of the Russians in 
the supply sector, including both armaments and foodstuffs.
Technology thus was not at issue; and production continued both in 
centralised and in decentralised workshops. A noted authority on eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century warfare has thus opined that the Ottoman defeat had 
nothing to do with the productive sector, but resulted from a reliance on 
army corps that were virtually militias and unable to withstand the massed 
artillery fire characteristic of warfare after 1750.78 Later in the eighteenth 
century, the Ottoman supply system collapsed as well, but only after having 
held out for quite some time.79 Therefore, many producers in the sultans’ 
realm must have remained active in spite of the difficulties analysed by 
Mehmet Genç. At the present stage, I have no answer to this contradiction; 
and we must hope for the results of future research.
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